The Practice of Equality: A Critical Understanding of Democratic Citizenship Education by Ruitenberg, Claudia W.
democracy & education, vol 23, no- 1  Feature Article 1
The Practice of Equality
A Critical Understanding of Democratic Citizenship Education
Claudia W. Ruitenberg
Abstract
This essay proposes a conception of citizenship that highlights its political aspects. Based on the work 
of Balibar, Rancière, and Biesta, it is argued that democratic citizenship education must include the 
education of equality. This means that students must have the opportunity to experience not only the 
membership aspect of citizenship that subjects them to the state but also the democratic aspect of citi-
zenship that positions them as equals to each other and capable of political intervention. The increas-
ing emphasis in state policies on the membership aspect of citizenship must be counterbalanced by an 
emphasis in education on the democratic aspect of citizenship: the education of equality. The pro-
posed conception of citizenship can be used to evaluate approaches to citizenship education.
Introduction
Citizenship is a contested concept. As Mike Bottery (2003) 
explains, citizenship involves, fundamentally, the relationship 
between individuals and a political body, and “at the present time 
the political body defining the terms and boundaries of citizen-
ship is something called ‘the nation state’” (p. 102). However, the 
nation state is a historically contingent, and not a necessary or 
self- evident, form of political organization. “A growing awareness 
of this artificiality and of its claims to citizen allegiance is increas-
ingly one of its weaknesses” (p. 104). For example, transnational 
people such as the Kurds, the Roma, and the Saami are members 
of nations that stretch across multiple states. For transnational 
people, an allegiance to the nation does not map onto an alle-
giance to the state in which they happen to live.1 Some of the 
indigenous peoples of North, Central, and South America are also 
transnational in the sense that their nations span the borders of 
current states such as Canada and the United States or the United 
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communicative skills and dispositions for rational deliberation, to 
those that acknowledge the messiness of the democratic process 
and the need to balance deliberative and more confrontational 
approaches. Among the latter and, in my view, more productive 
approaches are Nancy Fraser’s (1990) appreciation for the dissent-
ing force of subaltern counterpublics and Iris Marion Young’s 
(2001) critical understanding that “individuals and organizations 
seeking to undermine injustice and promote justice need both to 
engage in discussion with others to persuade them that there are 
injustices that ought to be remedied and to protest and engage in 
direct action” (p. 689). Peter Levine and Rose Marie Nierras (2007) 
supplement Young’s observation with a qualitative study involving 
60 interviews with activists and organizers of deliberation. They 
find that, in practice,
organizers of deliberation hold less rigid views of their own work than 
might be inferred from classic philosophical texts that define 
deliberation as the essence of democracy, that equate it with 
reasonableness or rationality, and that overlook situations in which 
more confrontational tactics are appropriate. (n.p.)
In spite of this acknowledgement of disagreement by some 
deliberative scholars, I turn to the work of contemporary French 
scholars Rancière and Balibar because they emphasize not just the 
importance of disagreement but, more particularly, disagreement 
about and in the name of citizens’ equality. I discuss this feature of 
their work in the next section. For the moment, let me address in 
greater detail their conception of political disagreement and 
where it occurs.
Like Chantal Mouffe, Rancière argues that disagreement is not 
a problem to be overcome in democracy but rather a constitutive 
feature of it (see Ruitenberg, 2009). However, I am concerned with 
Rancière’s dismissal of the institutions that organize society as 
places where democracy and politics by definition do not occur. 
Rancière (1995/1999) considers the social order and its institutions 
“the police” because this order “defines the allocation of ways of 
doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that . . . bodies 
are assigned by name to a particular place and task” (p. 29). He 
reserves the name “politics” only for activity that disrupts this 
order, that “shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a 
place’s destination” (p. 30). For Rancière, then, political activity 
does not occur within the institutions of any social order, but only 
in the disruption of those institutions.
Educational scholar Gert Biesta (2011a) discusses Rancière’s 
insistence on democracy and politics as taking place only in the 
moments of disruption of any established order. Biesta chooses to 
combine the views of Rancière with those of Mouffe so that we can 
see democratic politics taking place also in moments of disagree-
ment and disruption within the institutions of a given order, not 
only in, as Rancière would have it, the moments of establishing a 
new order: “Whereas for Mouffe there is democratic ‘work’ to be 
done within the domain of politics, that is, within a particular 
political order, Rancière’s anarchic approach in a sense denies that 
anything politically relevant might happen within the police order” 
(Biesta, 2011a, p. 148).
Balibar (2008) expresses his appreciation for and agreement 
with Rancière’s argument that democracy should be understood 
as a struggle, that is, as the ongoing “democratization of democ-
racy itself (or of what claims to represent a democratic regime)” 
(p. 526). However, Balibar also expresses his disagreement with 
what he calls “a neglect of the institutional dimension of democ-
racy” (p. 526). Like Mouffe and Biesta, Balibar believes this 
institutional dimension “cannot be left aside because equality also 
has to be written in institutions . . . and the democratization of 
institutions, including ‘public’ institutions, should not become 
confused with the problem of the construction of the sovereign 
state” (p. 526).
I agree with Rancière that the moment of the political is the 
moment of contestation of the exclusions of a social order, but I 
agree with Mouffe that such contestation can happen both within 
the institutions and at the borders of that order. Like Balibar, I 
believe it is a mistake to leave the institutional dimension out of our 
thinking about democracy, even if we emphasize the inevitably 
conflictual or agonistic nature of democracy. In this paper, there-
fore, I examine Balibar’s work on citizenship in order to locate 
Rancière’s argument for the centrality of equality and to arrive at a 
fuller conception of citizenship to guide the critical evaluation of 
concrete citizenship curricula and policies today.
Rancière is more interested in democracy and politics than he 
is in citizenship, because he sees the latter concept as constantly 
being pulled away from democracy and politics by the forces of the 
police order. A recent example of such forces would be the push for 
Big Society by the UK government, a policy initiative launched in 
2010 that includes measures that “encourage volunteering and 
involvement in social action,” “encourage charitable giving and 
philanthropy,” and “support the creation and expansion of mutuals, 
co- operatives, charities and social enterprises, and support these 
groups to have much greater involvement in the running of public 
services” (UK Cabinet Office, 2010). This conception of citizenship 
as civic involvement is visible as well in a curriculum framework 
issued by the British Columbia Ministry of Education (2001) called 
Social Responsibility, which I discuss toward the end of the paper. 
Rancière (1995/1999) writes about such developments with thinly 
disguised contempt:
To those who deplore the loss of republican citizenship, postdemocratic 
logic responds by proclaiming generalized citizenship. And so the town 
is called on to embody the identity of urban civilization with the 
community of the polis animated by its community soul. The 
citizen- enterprise is called on to show the identity of their productive 
and appropriating energy with the part played in the building of the 
community and the putting together of a microcosm of this 
community. (p. 114)
It is clear that, for Rancière, if citizenship is interpreted as the civic 
spirit of community building, it has little to do with democracy and 
politics. Rancière believes citizenship should and can be seen in a 
more political way, but it is difficult to keep it from being pulled 
back into the police order. In order to explain this, I turn to the 
work of Balibar, who has written in greater detail about the concept 
States and Mexico. In addition, the concept of citizenship is 
problematic for indigenous people upon whom the current 
political body that defines citizenship has been imposed. For 
example, Marie Battiste and Helen Semaganis (2002) write that 
Canada’s history of treaty federalism— that is, of “written 
[nation- to- nation] agreements between First Nations and the 
Imperial Crown” (p. 99)— explains why Canadian citizenship, 
defined as the mutual relation between individuals and the 
current political body of the Canadian state, is highly problem-
atic. “As protected nations under their prerogative treaties, 
Aboriginal peoples were never subject to the authority of the 
imperial Parliament, but remained as sovereign nations under 
the prerogatives of the Crown rather than as subjects of the 
Crown” (p. 100).
In spite of its contested nature, the concept of citizenship has 
not disappeared from either political or educational theory. In fact, 
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994) observe that, after the 
concept of citizenship went out of favor in the 1970s, it saw a 
resurgence in the 1990s. Scholarship on citizenship and citizenship 
education has continued since then, which perhaps can be 
explained by a combination of factors such as low voter turnouts 
and concerns about civic disengagement, increasing cultural 
diversity and concerns about social cohesion, and growing 
awareness of large- scale problems such as climate change that 
require commitments of individual citizens and larger political 
bodies alike (see Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 352).
The contemporary scholarship on citizenship education 
seems to be driven in particular by the desire to foster individual 
autonomy as well as contribute to the social and political fabric. 
However, concerns have been raised about education’s emphasis on 
the personal and the social and the lack of emphasis on the political 
aspects of citizenship. Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne (2004), 
for example, charge that “a vast majority of school- based service 
learning and community service programs embrace a vision of 
citizenship devoid of politics; they often promote service but not 
democracy” (p. 243). This concern echoes Kymlicka and Norman’s 
(1994) earlier observation that
in the absence of some account of legitimate and illegitimate ways to 
promote or enforce good citizenship, many works on citizenship 
reduce to a platitude: namely, society would be better if the people in it 
were nicer and more thoughtful. (p. 369)
In this essay I propose a way of understanding citizenship 
that places political aspects firmly in the center. For this framing  
I draw from philosophical work that I describe as post- Marxist: 
recent work by the French philosophers Etienne Balibar and 
Jacques Rancière.2 In particular I am interested in how these 
thinkers talk about the role of equality in citizenship and politics 
today. First, I describe and explain Rancière’s view of democratic 
citizenship as always focused on the disruption of the existing 
social order. I expand Rancière’s views with Balibar’s conception 
of citizenship as a dialectic between inequality (i.e., citizenship as 
status accorded by the state) and equality (the enactment of 
citizenship in holding the state to account). From these 
theoretical perspectives, I draw the conclusion that citizenship- 
as- equality should be the focus of citizenship education today. 
Finally, I examine two cases of citizenship education curriculum 
and policy from British Columbia, Canada, to see how they hold 
up under this theoretical lens.
Democracy, Institutions, and Disruption
The work of Rancière affords a particularly critical lens for 
thinking about questions of democracy and citizenship in educa-
tion. I appreciate Rancière’s (2002) uncompromising insistence on 
equality as a premise, an axiom, not a goal:
Equality is not a goal that governments and societies could succeed in 
reaching. To pose equality as a goal is to hand it over to the 
pedagogues of progress, who widen endlessly the distance they promise 
they will abolish. Equality is a presupposition, an initial axiom— or it 
is nothing. (p. 223)
Rancière’s counterintuitive stance on equality is sometimes 
misunderstood as a refusal or failure to acknowledge the serious-
ness of social and, especially, material inequality. This is a signifi-
cant misunderstanding, indeed, as Rancière’s work highlights the 
scandal between the inequality of social conditions and the 
equality of consciousness— or, in Rancière’s (1987/1991) terms, the 
“equality of intelligence”— that all men and women share. Todd 
May (2009) explains that “intelligence” in this Rancièrean sense is 
quite straightforward:
We are, unless we are deeply damaged in some way, capable of 
creating meaningful lives with one another, talking with one another, 
understanding one another, and reasoning about ourselves and our 
situations. Our social and political contexts, while sometimes difficult 
and complex, do not involve essential mysteries that we are in 
principle incapable of comprehending without the assistance of a 
savant of some sort. In short, we are capable of formulating and 
carrying out our lives with one another. (p. 7)
In positing equality as “initial axiom” (Rancière, 2002, p. 223), 
Rancière inverts the usual order of observing inequality today and 
aiming for equality tomorrow; instead, he argues, we should 
presuppose equality between human beings and seek to verify it in 
our actions. Taking equality as presupposition means we don’t ask 
how we may help people achieve the equality of consciousness that 
would allow them to reflect on their situation intelligently; rather, 
we ask what new possibilities emerge when people are treated as if 
they already have equality of consciousness and already reflect 
intelligently upon their situation (see Ruitenberg, 2008). I will 
return to these points.
I have also been inspired by Rancière’s insistence on the 
centrality of disagreement in the democratic process, especially 
because, certainly in Canada, there is a strong desire for agreement 
and consensus in education, and the dominant approach seems to 
be deliberative. Deliberative conceptions of democracy and 
citizenship education range from those that emphasize the 
Habermasian ideal speech situation and the promotion of 
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The Need for an Education of Equality Today
Whether one believes, as does Rancière, that equality is inherently 
primary and central in democracy and politics, or whether one 
believes that a greater emphasis on the egalitarian aspect of 
citizenship is needed today to restore a critical balance with the 
membership aspect, the end result for citizenship education is 
similar: it must emphasize equality. I mentioned earlier that, for 
Rancière, equality is not a goal but a presupposition. Let me explain 
in greater detail what he means by that, and how it affects citizen-
ship and citizenship education. For Rancière, equality is a funda-
mental and inalienable quality of persons and interpersonal 
relations; it is not, and cannot be, a quality of society: “The commu-
nity of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social 
institution. . . . Equality may be the law of the community, but 
society inevitably remains in thrall to inequality” (Rancière, 
1992/1995, p. 84). Society by definition introduces inequality 
because it creates order by assigning people a place and rank. This 
inequality, however, can never annihilate the equality that already 
exists between people and is constantly reasserted: the equality of 
intelligence, of “a community of speaking beings” who, together, 
invent discourse simply by wishing to speak and wishing to hear  
(p. 82, 85). That, then, is the fundamental assertion of equality: By 
speaking to you, I assume we are equals, me capable of saying 
something intelligible, you capable of understanding what I say. Or 
vice versa: By listening to you, I assume we are equals, you capable 
of saying something intelligible, me capable of understanding what 
you say. As soon as the people speaking and listening do so within a 
social order, the inequality of their places and ranks in that 
order— whether of kinship, of class, of gender or any other system 
of places and ranks— begins to chafe against this fundamental 
equality.
The egalitarian aspect of citizenship refers to the idea that 
citizenship is not a right one earns based on age, education, or 
effort; it is the aspect at an unbridgeable distance from all merito-
cratic systems of society. As Rancière (2004) puts it: “Democracy is 
the power of those who have no specific qualification for ruling, 
except the fact of having no qualification” (p. 305). This also means 
that, to the extent that education is approached meritocratically, 
there is a tension between the egalitarian aspect of citizenship and 
the idea of citizenship education. Borrowing May’s (2011) descrip-
tion of the immeasurable nature of equality in Rancière’s work, I say 
that the egalitarian aspect of citizenship signifies that one cannot 
not be a “better” or a “worse” citizen, or a citizen in light of particu-
lar qualities, but only a citizen— period. It is the fundamental right 
to speak and to be heard, to be counted. To truly believe in democ-
racy, then, is to commit oneself to equality, in the full sense of 
commitment as a faith and an enactment. Biesta (2011b) affirms 
that “‘commitment’ is in this regard quite an appropriate term,” as it 
involves not just a rational understanding but an emotional 
involvement. “The democratic subject, so we might say, is the one 
who is driven by a desire for democracy” (p. 96).
Schools, as social institutions, are by definition places of 
multiple inequalities: of age and grade level, of marks and degrees. 
For that reason, asserting equality in a school is no easy task (see 
Ruitenberg, 2008). Insofar as citizenship education is concerned 
with equality, the school may not be the best or primary location 
for such education. However, since schools remain the greatest 
common denominator among children, the possibilities for 
democratic citizenship education that exist within them, even if 
limited, should not be discounted.4
Schools are often deeply invested in the idea of education as 
preparation. For example, if citizenship is understood narrowly as 
focused on voting, and youth in elementary and secondary schools 
do not yet have the right to vote, then citizenship education can be 
seen as preparation for the future identity of citizen. Biesta (2011b) 
puts it as follows:
If . . . the ‘essence’ of democracy can . . . be expressed as a particular, 
well- defined singular order, then citizenship can be understood as a 
positive identity— that is, an identity that can be fully expressed and 
defined— and thus civic learning can be fully understood in terms of 
the acquisition of this identity by individuals. (p. 87)
From the preceding argument, it should be clear that neither Biesta 
nor I believe that citizenship is an identity that can be fully 
expressed and defined, or that citizenship education should be 
understood as the acquisition of that identity. In order to distin-
guish citizenship education as preparation for a well- defined 
identity of citizen from citizenship education as fostering commit-
ment to equality, Biesta (2011b) introduces the helpful concept of 
(political) subjectification, which he distinguishes from the 
socialization conception of civic learning. The latter
would see the aims of civic learning first and foremost in terms of the 
reproduction of an existing socio- political order and thus of the 
adaptation of individuals to this order, while [the subjectification 
conception of civic learning] would focus on the emergence of political 
agency and thus sees the aims of civic learning first and foremost in 
terms of the promotion of political subjectivity and agency. (pp. 86– 87)
I have argued that citizenship education today must emphasize the 
egalitarian aspect of citizenship, and this egalitarian aspect is best 
served by an approach that emphasizes political subjectification, so 
this subjectification conception should take center stage in the 
framework with which we evaluate citizenship curriculum and 
policy. How do we know whether a curriculum or policy gives 
room to political subjectification? Two key features emerge. The 
first is the extent to which the curriculum or policy emphasizes the 
egalitarian or constitutive role of citizens, that is to say, the extent to 
which it acknowledges and addresses citizenship as the democratic, 
political role of holding the state to account. The second is the 
extent to which the curriculum positions citizenship as something 
that can be enacted now rather than something for which the 
student is being prepared. These two features need to be seen in 
conjunction with each other: if a curriculum or policy presents 
citizenship as consisting in civic qualities such as helping one’s 
neighbor, then the absence of the aspect of citizenship as constitu-
tive force means that the emphasis on enactment in the here and 
now does not become political and enforces only the submissive, 
statutory aspect of citizenship. And if a curriculum or policy 
of citizenship and whose analysis helps to understand the opposing 
forces of what Rancière calls politics and the police within citizen-
ship itself.
Citizenship as a Dialectic  
between Inequality and Equality
Balibar (1988) traces the idea of citizenship historically and 
identifies two central aspects that remain in citizenship today:
“Citizenship” . . . has always marked two distinctions: it is bound to 
the existence of a state and therefore to a principle of public 
sovereignty, and it is bound to the acknowledged exercise of an 
individual “capacity” to participate in political decisions. (p. 723)
The first aspect of citizenship Balibar identifies here, that of its tie 
to the state, is what he elsewhere calls the “statutory” or legal aspect 
by which those who have the status of citizen in a particular state 
can be distinguished from those who do not have this status:
By definition, citizenship can only exist where we understand a notion 
of city to exist— where fellow citizens and foreigners are clearly 
distinguished in terms of rights and obligations in a given space. . . .  
In this respect, the modern nation is still, and must still consider itself, 
a city. (Balibar, 1996, p. 358)
The very concept of citizenship involves both a bounded space and 
the exclusion of those who are noncitizens from agreements of 
rights and responsibilities in that space. This first or statutory 
aspect of citizenship introduces inequality as it places citizens and 
noncitizens living in a given “city” in a hierarchical relation to the 
state that will or will not grant them citizenship. This is the 
membership aspect of citizenship that outlines one’s rights and 
responsibilities in a contract with the state of which and to which 
one is (a) subject. Today, since the state is almost always the 
nation- state, this is citizenship understood as nationality.
The second aspect of citizenship Balibar (1988) identifies is the 
capacity of the individual to participate in public decisions. 
Elsewhere he describes this as the aspect of self- constitution, “the 
expression of a collective political capacity to constitute the state or 
the public space” (Balibar, 1996, p. 364). In other words, where the 
statutory aspect of citizenship shows how the citizen is subject to 
the state, this constitutive aspect of citizenship shows how the state 
is subject to the citizen. “It is this notion,” explains Balibar (1996), 
“that provides the link between the idea of citizenship and that of 
equality” (p. 364). This second aspect of citizenship emphasizes the 
capacity of citizens to create and change the borders of the commu-
nity to which they belong, and to hold the governance of this 
community to account.
Balibar (1996) further explains these two aspects of citizen-
ship in relation to the two conceptions of “the people,” in the first or 
hierarchical sense as “community, affiliation or identity” and in the 
second or egalitarian sense as “will and egalitarian collective 
power” (p. 369). It is important to note that, according to Balibar, 
these two aspects are both undeniably present in contemporary 
citizenship: the hierarchical or statutory aspect and the egalitarian 
or constitutive aspect are poles in a permanent dialectic. In a more 
recent article, Balibar (2010a) uses the concept of antinomie, a 
contradiction of laws or principles, to argue that “citizenship’s 
problem, in its various historical figures, with all their enormous 
differences, lies in its antinomic relationship to democracy” and 
that, from his dialectical perspective, “this kind of antinomy forms 
the essential driving force of historical transformations” (pp. 1– 2). 
Put differently, it is precisely because citizenship involves both 
submission to the state and constitution of the state, and because 
these statutory and egalitarian aspects are inherently in tension, 
that change is possible.
Balibar observes that, today, especially under the influence of 
European anxieties about migration, increasing weight is being 
placed on the statutory aspects of citizenship. Achieving legal 
status in the European Union has been made so difficult that 
scholars and media commentators now speak of Fortress Europe 
(see Geddes, 2000). This reinforcement of the statutory aspect calls 
for a reconsideration of the egalitarian aspect: “By a symmetry 
inscribed throughout the history of the concept of citizen, the 
emphasis on the statutory and hierarchical aspect of citizenship 
allows us to reformulate the question in reference to its egalitarian 
aspect” (Balibar, 1996, p. 367). In other words, if the state occupies 
itself more with the delimitation of citizenship in the sense of 
membership and obligation, citizens should occupy themselves 
more with their constitutive powers, their capacity to decide the 
borders of the demos and to hold the state to account. Biesta (2011b) 
has argued:
Citizenship is not so much a status, something which can be achieved 
and maintained, but . . . it should primarily be understood as 
something that people continuously do: citizenship as practice. . . . 
Citizenship is . . . not an identity that someone can ‘have,’ but first and 
foremost a practice of identification . . . with public issues that are of a 
common concern. (p. 13)3
Based on Balibar’s analysis, I would modify Biesta’s argument 
slightly: While citizenship is both a status and a practice, the 
emphasis that nation- states and supranational governments 
currently place on the statutory aspect demands a greater focus on 
citizenship as a practice of identification with public issues that are 
of a common concern.
Rancière (2006) captures these two aspects of citizenship 
when he notes that “citizen” can be a political name, but is not 
automatically so. “Citizen” can be used to denote a place and role 
(status) in the “police order” and, in that mode, the name “citizen” 
designates the exclusion of “such and such a part of the population 
from citizenship or  . . . such and such a domain of collective life 
from the reign of civic equality” (p. 301). By contrast, “citizen” can 
also be used as a political name— or, more precisely, as the name of 
a political activity— and, in that mode, “‘citizen’ opposes the rule of 
equality fixed by law and by principle to the inequalities that 
characterize ‘men,’ that is, private individuals subjected to the 
powers of birth and wealth” (p. 301). The two aspects of the concept 
of citizenship thus refer to two types of relation with the state.
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that she was not yet of voting age. Her speech was not about the 
right to speak based on her status as citizen- voter but about the 
right to speak based on her equality as citizen- participant.5
The second example is not a course curriculum but a curricu-
lum framework called Social Responsibility (British Columbia 
Ministry of Education, 2001). This framework is not mandatory, so 
schools choose whether, and to what extent, they try to meet these 
performance standards. The standards fall into four sets of expecta-
tions: (a) contributing to the classroom and school community,  
(b) solving problems in peaceful ways, (c) valuing diversity and 
defending human rights, (d) exercising democratic rights and 
responsibilities (British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2001, p. 4). 
The curriculum framework seems to be of two minds about citizen-
ship. The first two sets of expectations suggest a social and personal 
orientation; the latter two use the firm political language of “defend-
ing human rights” and “exercising democratic rights.” In spite of the 
claim that “this framework focuses attention on the participatory 
view of citizenship that is valued in Canadian policy and curriculum 
documents” (British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2001, p. 5), the 
dominant tone of the document is one that emphasizes social 
responsibility as a desirable quality of individual students, which will 
reduce problems among students and in the school more generally:
Currently the standards are being implemented in schools throughout 
the province as a way of: monitoring school improvement; improving 
school and classroom climate; dealing with school issues (e.g., fighting, 
vandalism); enhancing subject- specific learning activities or units (e.g., 
study of the Holocaust); giving direction to leadership, service and 
social justice clubs; assessing the progress of individual students. (p. 7)
There is nothing in this list that suggests a political or democratic 
priority in the sense of students’ equality and their capacity to 
monitor the state. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the document 
identifies that its “standards for social responsibility . . . are a 
continuation of the work begun in the reference sets Evaluating 
Group Communication Skills Across Curriculum and Evaluating 
Problem Solving Across Curriculum” (p. 5). Indeed, group commu-
nication skills and problem- solving skills, while they may be useful, 
are quite different from the commitment to equality or “desire for 
democracy” that are needed for democratic citizenship education.
The emphasis of the BC Social Responsibility framework on 
reducing conflict and working together in one’s community is not 
unique in citizenship education. Westheimer and Kahne (2004) 
notice a lack of attention to the political dimension of citizenship in 
many citizenship education programs and take a clear stand against 
this lack: “Personal responsibility, voluntarism, and character 
education must be considered in a broader social context or they 
risk advancing civility or docility instead of democracy” (p. 244). 
Similarly, in his analysis of Scottish citizenship education, Biesta 
(2011b) observes that it reveals a social more than a political 
approach to citizenship, in which the relationship of individuals to 
each other and to their communities is prioritized over their 
relationship to the state (p. 24). The point is not that students 
should be unpleasant to each other and careless about their 
communities, but I agree with Biesta that
an almost exclusive emphasis on these aspects runs the danger that the 
political dimensions of citizenship, including an awareness of the 
limitations of personal responsibility for effective political action and 
change, remain invisible and become unattainable for children and 
young people. (p. 26)
The Social Responsibility framework emphasizes community 
membership in much the same way the UK Big Society initiative 
does: It encourages youth to be respectful and active members of 
their neighborhoods and communities, but it remains limited to 
what Westheimer and Kahne (2004) have called the “personally 
responsible” and “participatory” (p. 242) conceptions of citizen-
ship. The egalitarian, constitutive aspect of citizenship that I have 
emphasized, and that fits in what Westheimer and Kahne have 
called the “justice- oriented” (p. 242) conception of citizenship, is 
significantly different from the neighborliness encouraged by 
Social Responsibility and Big Society. Contestation of the state and 
the way it orders society is entirely lacking in neighborliness, and it 
is not essential or promoted in the types of social (rather than 
political) participation that these approaches advance.
Conclusion
I have argued that citizenship should be understood not only in its 
statutory sense but also— and, in today’s world, especially— in its 
sense of the equal capacity of everybody to voice and enact 
citizenship. In other words, I have argued for the strengthening of 
the political and democratic aspect of citizenship in citizenship 
education.
There are elements of citizenship education in elementary and 
secondary schooling that are legitimately about civic socialization. 
That is to say, they are concerned with citizenship in its statutory 
aspect. These elements are what school curriculum has in common 
with the prep guides for those who wish to become legal citizens of 
a particular country. For example, Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (2014) advises those who wish to apply for Canadian 
citizenship that as part of the citizenship test, they will be asked 
questions on subjects such as:
the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of Canadian citizens, 
Canada’s democracy and ways to take part in Canadian society, 
Canadian political and military history (including the political system, 
monarchy and branches of government), Canadian social and cultural 
history and symbols, and Canadian physical and political geography.
This is not dissimilar from the Informed Citizenship category of the 
curriculum for Civic Studies 11, which advises teachers:
It is expected that students will: demonstrate a knowledge of historical 
and contemporary factors that help define Canadian civic identity . . . ; 
identify historical roots of the Canadian political and legal systems; 
describe the division of powers in Canada among federal, provincial, 
territorial, First Nations, and municipal governments; describe 
Canada’s electoral systems and processes. (British Columbia Ministry 
of Education, 2005, pp. 22– 23)
presents citizenship as consisting in democratic participation and 
contestation but offers this idea of citizenship only as information 
about historical events or as relevant to the student’s future as 
full- fledged member of the polity, then the absence of opportuni-
ties to enact citizenship and experience democratic commitment 
today means that the emphasis on the constitutive and egalitarian 
aspect of citizenship rings hollow and remains caught in an idea of 
citizenship as a predefined role.
Citizenship Curriculum in British Columbia
Let me now turn to two cases of citizenship education curriculum 
and policy and see how they hold up under this theoretical lens. 
While this is not a full curriculum or policy review, I hope these 
two examples are illustrative of the framework I have laid out.
Under current graduation program requirements, all students 
in British Columbia must complete one of the following three 
courses: Social Studies 11, BC First Nations Studies 12, or Civic 
Studies 11. The course that is most obviously and directly con-
cerned with citizenship education is Civic Studies, a course that 
was first implemented in BC in 2005. The official curriculum 
document, known in British Columbia as the Integrated Resource 
Package (IRP), states the following aims of the course:
The aim of Civic Studies 11 is to enhance students’ abilities and 
willingness to participate actively and responsibly in civic life. Civic 
Studies 11 offers opportunities for students to deliberate individually 
and with others on civic matters— local to global— for the purpose of 
becoming informed decision makers empowered in civic action. The 
course is intended as a study in civics, where the study about civics is a 
means to that end. Civic Studies 11 offers opportunities for students to 
form reasoned views on issues, and to participate in socially relevant 
projects and real- life learning for the purpose of developing civic 
mindedness. This course enables students to relate their learning in 
school to their civic duties and expectations, enhance their sense of 
membership in society, and increase their ability to take more active 
roles as citizens of Canada and the world. (British Columbia Ministry 
of Education, 2005, p. 11)
One of the promising qualities of this course rationale is the 
understanding that a study about civics is not enough and in this 
course is considered a means to the end of a study in civics, which 
includes opportunities to participate. However, the participation 
that is so commendably part of the course is described in social, 
not political, terms as participation in “socially relevant projects.” 
While the terms democracy and democratic are used elsewhere in 
the document, their absence from the course rationale is notewor-
thy. The civic action, civic mindedness, and citizenship that feature 
so prominently in the course aims are not characterized here as 
democratic. In addition, by qualifying citizenship as citizenship “of 
Canada and the world,” the idea that citizenship is about belonging 
to a community is emphasized.
Civic Studies 11 takes a clearly deliberative perspective on 
citizenship education. This is evident not only in Civic Delibera-
tion being one of the four sets of prescribed learning outcomes 
(PLOs) (in addition to Skills and Processes of Civic Studies, 
Informed Citizenship, and Civic Action) but also in the emphasis 
on deliberation in other parts of the curriculum. For example, 
under Civic Action it is mentioned that students should be able to 
“apply skills of civic discourse and dispute resolution, including 
consensus building, negotiation, compromise, and majority rule” 
(British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 23). The concern 
this deliberative angle raises is that it de- emphasizes the egalitar-
ian, constitutive aspect of citizenship, which positions the citizen 
not as rational, deliberative contributor to the state but as a critical 
assessor of the state and potentially in disagreement with it. 
Indeed, key to the work of Rancière, Mouffe, Balibar, and Biesta 
alike is that they emphasize disagreement in democratic politics 
and are critical of the deliberative approach. Balibar (1996), for 
example, insists “that we not exaggerate the importance of consen-
sus to the detriment of conflict” (p. 370). And Rancière (1995/1999) 
puts it more forcefully: political activity, the disruption of a social 
order, is an expression of disagreement with the imposition of 
inequality and begins with the perception that equality has been 
wronged.
While curriculum documents are an important source of 
information about curriculum, their interpretation and use by 
educators in the field can shed light not only on the areas explicitly 
prioritized and emphasized in the text but also on the space left for 
educators’ own priorities and emphases. Paul Orlowski taught the 
Civic Studies 11 curriculum in a Vancouver high school in 
2005/2006 and reflected on the experience in the article “Youth 
‘Participaction’ & Democracy: Reflections on Teaching Civic 
Studies 11 in British Columbia” (2008). Already an experienced 
social studies teacher, Orlowski looked not for what the curricu-
lum told him to do but what it allowed him to do. He notes that 
“several of the prescribed learning outcomes in the course IRP 
create the possibilities for counter- hegemonic discourses to take 
root— provided the teacher holds the belief that teaching is a 
political act. I am one such teacher” (p. 113). Orlowski made 
enthusiastic use of these possibilities and connected the prescribed 
curriculum to current political events and developments in British 
Columbia, Canada, and abroad. For example, he found that “the 
PLO on political ideologies gave [him] state- sanctioned permis-
sion to teach about different versions of the good citizen, as well as 
current social and economic issues, in municipal, provincial, 
national, and international contexts” (p. 115).
His experience teaching Civic Studies 11 was clearly positive, 
and he provides several examples of the ways in which his students 
fulfilled the civic action component of the course, thereby indeed 
enacting citizenship as practice. In particular, he recounts how one 
of his students wrote “an unsolicited speech . . . about her outrage” 
at a member of Parliament who changed his party allegiance 
(“crossed the floor”) after having been elected. The student then 
read her speech in a public park during a political protest. This 
example and Orlowski’s experience more generally suggest that the 
course can create opportunities for students to become not just 
rationally and deliberatively but also passionately involved in 
political issues. Moreover, the student who wrote and delivered a 
public speech against floor- crossing parliamentarians enacted her 
equality: She clearly did not feel limited in her speech by the fact 
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Notes
 1. I am indebted to Shayna Plaut for educating me about this issue.
 2. Both Balibar and Rancière were students of Louis Althusser at the Ecole 
Normale Supérieure in Paris and coauthored the book Reading Capital (Lire le 
Capital) with him, but only Balibar is mentioned as coauthor in the English 
translation of the book available today. So, there certainly are differences in the 
relation these authors have to the work of Althusser (and to Marxism more 
generally), but in this paper, I am not concerned with the extent to which their 
work is faithful to Marxism or not.
 3. Adrian Oldfield (1990) and others have earlier made this distinction between 
citizenship as status or identity and citizenship as practice. Audrey Osler (2005) 
further adds to these two dimensions the third dimension of citizenship as feeling.
 4. I am indebted to Kathy Bickmore on this point.
 5. In 2012/13 only 1,006 BC students who wrote an exam in one of these courses 
did so in Civic Studies 11. The vast majority (45,366) did the exam in Social Studies 
11 (BC Ministry of Education, 2013). So, if we are looking at the Civic Studies 11 
curriculum, we should keep in mind that this course does not (yet) reach a great 
number or percentage of the BC students.
The reason I say it is legitimate to include such elements of civic 
socialization in the curriculum is that several studies suggest that 
there is a connection between political knowledge and political 
engagement. William Galston (2001) summarizes the research as 
follows: “The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs, the 
less likely they are to experience a generalized mistrust of, or 
alienation from, public life” and “the more likely they are to 
participate in public matters” (p. 224; see also Torney- Purta, 
2002). Biesta (2011b) acknowledges that “young people them-
selves have indicated a lack of knowledge and understanding in 
this area” and that this is good reason not to dismiss entirely 
some of the more traditional approaches to citizenship education 
(p. 6). However— and this is a big however— if educators, curricu-
lum designers, and educational policymakers wish to take 
democratic citizenship in its democratic aspect seriously, they 
must ensure that the curricular elements of civic socialization do 
not overshadow the opportunities for civic subjectification. Or, to 
put it in the language of Balibar: for education to take democratic 
citizenship seriously in its global context today, it must place 
considerably greater emphasis on the egalitarian aspect of 
citizenship than it has traditionally done. This egalitarian aspect 
cannot be taught in the relative tidiness of the classroom but must 
include opportunities for students to enact and practice their 
equal capacity as speaking beings outside of the classroom— in 
the larger school community but also in social movements and in 
the media. The work of the Council of Youth Research, in which 
Los Angeles high school youth critically questioned politicians, 
school superintendents, and policymakers, is a good example of 
this (Mirra, Morrell, Cain, Scorza, & Ford, 2013).
While the egalitarian aspect of citizenship is important— and 
currently arguably the most important— it is not the only aspect of 
citizenship. The statutory aspect of citizenship reminds us of the 
fact that citizens are also subjected to the state. The conditions of 
that subjection, especially the borders that separate those who can 
consider themselves a part of the state from those who cannot, are 
important targets of democratic interrogation. Citizens, in the 
sense of those who are recognized by the state as legitimate 
members of the demos, have the ability to exert pressure on the 
state on precisely this point of legitimate membership. Seyla 
Benhabib (2004) has argued that “people” in the sense of ethnos 
and in the sense of demos do not coincide and that the demos can 
both invoke and revoke its own constitution in a process she calls 
“democratic iterations” (pp. 180– 181). Balibar (1996), likewise, 
insists that there is a difference and “tension between the idea of 
peuple as a community (Ein volk [sic] [or a people]) and the idea of 
peuple as a principle of equality and social justice (das Volk [or the 
people])” (p. 372). I believe that precisely this contestation of the 
borders and composition of the demos must be part of citizenship 
education today. Biesta (2011b) argues that “questions about the 
definition of citizenship” and “a critical examination of the 
conditions of young people’s citizenship” should be part of 
citizenship education (p. 16). Such a self- reflective citizenship 
education, a citizenship education that considers its own condi-
tions and boundaries, would include, for example, discussion 
about which members of society do not have rights as members of 
the polity. It would discuss how people can enact citizenship- as- 
equality even if they have not achieved citizenship- as- status. It 
would educate students about “the daily process of resistances and 
vindications of basic rights on the part of the foreigners, which 
make them members of an active community of citizens, even 
before they are granted formal citizenship” (Balibar, 2010b, p. 320). 
And it would afford students opportunities to publicly voice their 
views about, or participate in, such resistances and vindications.
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